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AUTHOR Cleveland, Harlan
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ABSTRACT

A lecture on the critical issues of the 1970s from the vantage point of changing attitudes was presented at the 1979 annual meeting of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities. The review summarizes how the public's basic attitudes toward government, world interdependence, technology, and economic equity, for example, changed policies toward defense, the environment, economic growth, and international affairs. The shift in some important attitudes are attributed to the effect of formal or informal education. A primary task for higher education is shown to be the use of modern technology to meet human needs and purposes. Disarmament, human rights, and world resources are also discussed. (SW)

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Renewing the Boundless Resource

A Lecture by
Harlan Cleveland

American Association of
State Colleges and Universities



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"Renewing the Boundless Resource"

Harlan Cleveland

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Allan W. Ostar, President
Sandra K. Ralston, Editor

From my time as President of the University of Hawaii, I am familiar with some of the expectations of the office that are demanded of you—those "qualities of leadership" you are expected to display, that unwarranted optimism you must retain: expecting to find good news in situations in which most people despair, and about which the experts are telling the leader to do nothing cautiously.

Having struggled up that learning curve myself, I remain fascinated by the dilemmas of leadership that now confront you throughout the year. To all of the old dichotomies for which the answer always was, "it all depends, " the answer now seems to be, "both". Liberal arts or career education? Both. Raising academic standards or open admissions? Both. Federal student aid or institutional aid? Both. Campus bound programs or external degrees? Both. State centralization of governance or institutional autonomy? It's going to have to be some of both.

In the past few months I have been preoccupied with the quality of national and international leadership and what we as educators could be, and ought to be, doing about it. Beneath all the dilemmas of educational management there exists basic raw material that, as the program says, is renewable. It's people deriving wisdom from knowledge again and again. The organizers of this convention have called it, with an upbeat that's refreshing, "The Boundless Resource".

My text for this Monday morning non-sermon will be taken from Russell Baker, certainly the best political humorist of our time. Have you ever noticed that it's the humorist who gets there first, who correctly quesses—long before the rest of us—what it is that is going to bug us? In 1927 E. B. White had one of his characters talk about "a bright future for complexity" in the United States of America. He was afraid of complexity, James Thurber reveled in it, but they were both preoccupied with it. And it's been the name of the game ever since. White's character went on to say: "Have you ever considered how complicated things can get, what with one thing leading to another?" And then Walt Kelly (creator of "Pogo") helped out, I think, with his "I have met the enemy and he is us," preparing us for ending the Vietnam War. (The first war we ever lost, it says in history books these days. I've read some history and I didn't think we had done so well in 1812.)

And now: on November 13, Russell Baker has a dialogue with himself on the kind of leadership this country needs today. "Leadership. The country yearns for new leadership for a new era." "If led, will the country follow?" "If given the right kind of leadership, the country will surely follow." "But which kind of leadership is the right kind?" "The leadership that leads the country in the direction it wants to take." "And what specific direction does the country want to take?" "Who knows? That's for the leader to figure out. If he's the right kind of leader, he will guess correctly."

"Am I wrong," he concludes, "in concluding that it isn't leadership that the country wants in a president, but followership?"

A part of this lecture appeared under the Title "A Rich Vein of Good News", The Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1979.

"We are part of the process by which people are making up their minds; the part called higher education. When the people don't make up their minds, we don't make policy."

You're not only right, Russell Baker, but I propose to argue this morning that what you suggest is good news. And you're not alone in your thoughts.

Some of you probably have as compulsory reading in your schools and colleges, Mao's little Red Book. There is a lot of garbage in Mao's little Red Book. Some of it simply rewrites ancient Chinese aphorisms in Marxist terms. But there are a few passages that are incandescent in their insight about leadership. In one of them Mao is speaking to the cadres, to the administrative leaders, people like yourselves. Mao says (I'll translate into American): Look, you cadres don't get the idea that you're making the policy. You're not making the policy, the masses are, but the masses can only do it in a very inchoate way. It's up to you to get out and sniff around, figure out where the masses are going. Then you can do the things the masses don't know how to do. You organize; you budget; you program; you codify; you implement. Then you had better check again with the masses because by the time you get it all programmed, they might not still be going in the same direction. Then you go back, revise, redo your plans. This cyclical process between the cadres and the masses, says Mao, is the correct "theory of knowledge". Now, I don't know if that's the way things work in China or not, but it's a pretty good description of how they work in the United States of America. That is to say, the people have to make the policy and other social institutions can formulate it and carry it out.

If you don't want to take your philosophy from Mao Tse Tung, then maybe you'll take it from John Gardner. "People", he says, "not leaders, really make the policy. The national dialogue is an untidy but impressive process. Very few, almost no, major innovations are enacted at the federal level that are not preceded by at least three to 10 years of national discussion and debate. Ideas that eventually will become the basis for major change in federal policy are first put into circulation by individuals and small groups".

These individuals and groups are sensing a public mood before the public is told by the media what their mood is supposed to be. When a pollster asks the right question, or a journalist correctly sniffs some mood, or a legislator proposes a policy after talking to constituents, he or she helps to convert the inchoate policy into programmatic form.

A political leader may sense that change of mood and ride to power on it, as Jimmy Carter did in 1976. He correctly guessed, for example, that after Vietnam and Watergate, the people yearned for honesty and plain speaking, that religious virtues were still good politics, and that people had already grown out of their post-Viet Nam despondency. The experts were still saying that Americans were in the post-Viet Nam period; but the people were waiting for a leader to articulate a post- post-Viet Nam policy that combined a strong military stance with a major effort to reduce the cost of defense.

We are part of the process by which people are making up their minds; the part called higher education. When the people don't make up their minds, we don't make policy. The people haven't yet decided on an energy policy, so we don't have an energy policy, no matter what they do in Washington. But, curiously enough, the people at large do understand by instinct the central principles of crisis management—and that has made it possible for the President and even the Congress to play it cool, so far at least, in the current crisis about the hostages in Teheran.

In the midst of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, I wrote down what I thought were the simple imperatives of crisis management. First, keep your objectives limited. Keep remembering what they are. Making ourselves feel good is not one of them. Soliciting love and gratitude is not one of them. Eliciting respect and getting results are. Second, decide how far you are ultimately willing to go, and don't start someting you don't know how to finish. Third, creep up carefully on the use of force, because it is a one-way escalator. Fourth, widen the community that is concerned, even at the expense of subordinate aims. And fifth, watch carefully the precedents you set. The law you make may be your own; that is, it may be applied to you in another time and place.[1] People seem instinctively to understand all this, and therefore it is possible for our leaders to act as though they understand it, too.

What I have been saying brings me to the theme of your conference, and not by as roundabout a route as may at first appear. You are in the business of preparing the nation's leading followers for leadership. In this society, nobody is in charge. That was Nixon's problem, he thought he was in charge. Nobody is in charge and, therefore, we are all partly in charge. And that's the boundless resource. Not people in general; not education as such; the boundless resource is *educated* people.

In Hawaii I had perhaps an unusual experience—to live in a political environment in which politicians could not be against the university as such and get elected to anything. The state university in Hawaii is well recognized as the prime upward mobility machine for a very upwardly mobile society. So nobody campaigned against the university as an institution. But often I was faced in the legislature with trying to answer the question: what's it for? Why higher education? Give us the justification. Write it all down in paragraphs; give us the cost-benefit calculations. I said the sorts of things that you say: that the case for education is the case for developing a people who can fulfill themselves. But in the end, generally I was reduced to saying "Listen, Senator, you've got to have faith."

But now I've come to believe that there is an additional and perhaps more important case for education, and that is the case for developing the capacities to understand enough about the world to change our minds about it—and thereby to change the world. The case for education is the case for a global perspective for American citizens—so that American citizens can cope with a world that is certainly too much with us.

Legislators, in my experience, did quite often ask, "What have you educators done for us lately?" So I think we have to address the question: what have we done lately for this kind of education, education for leadership in global perspective?

I would like to argue here that we don't need to rely on predicting what you might do in the 1980's because we have a track record in the 1970's to make our case. Educated people, our boundless resource, have been changing their minds very fast. And that's good news.

We will shortly bid the 1970's goodbye. Most of the people I know are ready to say "good riddance," next New Year's Eve, to a decade which Amer-

[1]Harlan Cleveland, "Crisis Diplomacy", *Foreign Affairs*, No. 4, July, 1963.

"The good news is the shift in some very important attitudes. And attitude shifts are a consequence of education, formal or informal."

icans are bound to remember for Vietnam, Watergate, stagflation, and an embarrassing poverty of political leadership. But just beneath the surface of events, you will find, I think, a rich vein of good news. The good news is the shift in some very important attitudes. And attitude shifts are a consequence of education, formal or informal.

Consider what was bugging us when the decade began. We were preoccuppied with multiple dangers: from nuclear war, from the mindless march of modern technology, from the proliferation of oppressive regimes, from the apparently widening gap between population and resources, from a growth ethic that seemed to produce each year uglier cities, more impoverished land, more intractable human poverty, and a-thickening cloud of pollutants in our daily experience. We also held some dubious illusions: that our national economy could be "fine tuned", as the Keynesians say; that the dollar was fundamentally sound; that the global drive for fairness could be safely palliated and otherwise ignored; that others might be interdependent on us, but we weren't interdependent with them; that we might have to bargain with the rest of the world but we didn't have to share; and that our institutions were capable of coping with the exponential growth of complexity.

As we now face the 1980's, some of those dangerous trends have been sharply and surprisingly reversed and some of our fondest illusions have been swept away. Together, these shifts may be the beginning of a new wisdom. Not wholly at random, I will mention five trends reversed, and five forgettable fantasies—in all, 10 products of an educated citizenry in the sobering 70's that could make the 80's a decade of hope and promise, if the higher education enterprise keeps its eye on the ball.

First, we turned off the war in Vietnam—by losing it. We never even considered using our nuclear arsenal to change that outcome. A superpower learns that military strength alone is no guarantee against becoming, as Stanley Hoffman puts it, "Gulliver tied, or the biggest fly on the flypaper." The Chinese, who have their own way of saying everything, have their own way of saying this too: "Big Noise on Stairs Nobody Coming Down."

SALT, I and II are not yet the beginning of disarmament, but they codify that astonishingly stable, if unattractive, form of peace called mutual deterrence—what Churchill called "two scorpions in a bottle," a balance of power based on parallel uncertainties in the face of unprecedented weaponry. It's a new kind of balance of power. The old balance of power was based on the certainty of what the other fellow would do; this one is based on the uncertainty. The Russian military planners, Chairman Breshnev and company, don't know what we would do *if;* and their uncertainty is soundly rooted in our own. We don't know what we would do *if,* either. So our uncertainty is credible, and that's the deterrent.

Even though the world is still spending 8 percent more on arms than on educating a billion children, we have started to put a lid on the scale of warfare—by inventing history's first unusable weapons. And it is our attitudes about the weapons, not the capability of the weapons, that will keep them secure in their silos.

Second, the worm has turned on the inevitability of science and technology. The idea used to be that if we could think it up, we surely should manufacture

and deploy it. But this "inner logic" of technological change is being shoved aside now by the notion that the future directions and purposes of technology are matters for social determination—that is, for us the people to decide.

The watershed, I suppose, was the decision not to build a U.S. supersonic airliner, despite the French and British decision to go ahead with the Concorde. Before the decade had ended, the British and French had cooled off on that idea, too. The environmental movement's shouts of "Hey, wait a minute!" began in the 70's to drown out technology's inner logic. NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, came into effect on January 1, 1970, so it makes a convenient historical punctuation mark. The deal with the Soviets not to make any more antiballistic missile systems, even though both sides had developed prototypes, was another straw in the same sane wind. So is the dwindling enthusiasm for nuclear energy as a way to make electricity, and the tightening regulation of carcinogenic foods and drugs.

The new public attitude can be caricatured. The city council of Cambridge, Massachusetts, caricatured it by asserting municipal jurisdiction over the pace and direction of genetic research at Harvard University. But a caricature not only exposes a prominent feature to ridicule; it calls attention to a feature's prominence. If we the followers are going to take modern technology by the hand—or by the scruff of the neck—and lead it toward human needs and purposes, that's certainly a primary task for higher education.

Third, we have seen in the 1970's a fusion of demands for political rights with demands for meeting basic human needs, worldwide, and this has invigorated the international human rights movement. The way a government treats its own people, issues of fairness in the "domestic politics" of nation-states, used to be considered privileged, protected by sovereignty. But, in the surprising 70's, a President of the United States could stand in the U. N. General Assembly and declare that, "No member of the United Nations can claim the mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business." He was talking, he made it clear, not only about torture of political prisoners, but about the "unwarranted deprivation" of the poor. Nobody jeered.

The wobbly launching of that Carter human rights initiative (its impact on arms control negotiations, the President said later, was a surprise to him) should not obscure its true historic quality. As I learned in Hawaii, the force and power of great wave doesn't depend on the skill of the surfer who tries to ride it.

To fuse three kinds of human rights—the political rights that the state can assure by simply not oppressing its citizens, the civil rights which require the state's affirmative action, and the economic and social entitlements expressed in the 1970's phrase "basic human needs"—provides a strong doctrinal basis for the world's first truly global revolution. All previous revolutions, the Christian, the Moslem and the Marxian, had to settle for primary dominance in one or another world region. We are going to have to learn to work with, not against, the worldwide revolution of fairness and freedom which pops out in such exotic forms and provokes such nasty counter-revolutions as we're seeing in Iran right now. And that is a task for higher education.

Fourth, the race between world population and world resources doesn't look nearly as scary in 1979 as it did in 1970, or even in 1972, when the best-seller *The Limits to Growth* was published.

". . . we have started to put a lid on the scale of warfare—by inventing history's first unusable weapons. And it is our attitudes about the weapons, not the capabilities of the weapons, that will keep them secure in their silos."

What was then projected as an exponential growth of the population now seems more to resemble the familiar biological S-curve. Early in the decade, demographers could snatch headlines, sell books, and be taken seriously if they predicted the world's population would grown to 7.5 or even 8 billion by the year 2000. The current U. N. prediction doesn't even reach 6 billion by then. The forecasters committed the original statistical sin of mistaking current trends for human destiny. They were mousetrapped by countervailing trends: development, chemicals, women's instincts, and hope all proved difficult to fit into a computer program.

I do not want to be misunderstood about this. Two billion more mouths to feed, a billion more jobs to create, those aren't trivial tasks to accomplish in a short generation. But they might just be manageable. The assignment implied by the earlier projections looked simply impossible and produced all that nonsense about lifeboats and triage.

On the resources side of the equation, we also have gained in knowledge, insight, and wisdom. The early 70's fright about limits to growth was a useful wake-up tonic. But it soon became evident, mostly from the work of university scholars, that the "problematique," as the Club of Rome called it, was not a shortage of resources as such, but a shortage of imagination, institutions, and political will to control ourselves in using the biosphere's rich and versatile endowment. We learned that there even would be plenty of the non-renewable fossil fuels and hard minerals, if conserving attitudes and international cooperation were not in such short supply. Beyond the non-renewables lies a hugely underutilized biomass. Three-fifths of the world mass is plants, including trees; another fifth is you and I and the other animals; and one-fifth of the weight of the world's biomass is microorganisms, "microbes"—an inconceivably numerous army of workers now underemployed making cheese and sauerkraut and fermenting beer and wine. There also exists, of course, a supply of solar radiation which, for all practical purposes, is infinite. These renewable resources are disproportionately available in the world's tropical regions, which are home for most of the absolute poor.

Beyond the physical and biological resources, *information* has come in the 1970's to be regarded as a resource, too. It is not marginal. Peter Drucker says it is now the key resource in our business economy. It is not depletable. John McHale taught us that information expands as it is used. It is not scarce. Louis Branscomb of IBM says information "is in quantitative surplus. To be sure, there are great gaps in human knowledge that have yet to be filled by research and study. But the yawning chasm is between what some have learned and others have not yet put to use." If you want to pursue his extremely interesting thinking on that, have a look at his *Science* magazine article.[1]

We are now, it seems, not about to "run out of" resources because educated people, the boundless resource, have been changing their way of thinking about resources. To complete that change in attitude is another task for higher education, which certainly ought to be the central citadel of the information society.

Fifth, a new growth ethic is emerging. We the people are changing our minds about the very purposes of life and work. The old ethic was rapid material

[1]Louis Branscomb, "Information: The Ultimate Frontier," *Science*, January 12, 1979.

growth, powered by technological innovation, supported by exuberant optimism, measured and symbolized by GNP, that grotesque index that treats increases in food production and addictive drugs as equally valid signs of economic health. In reaction against the environmental and social impacts of growth guided mostly by marketplace demand, we had a brief flirtation with no-growth as an alternate philosophy. But we broke off the flirtation as soon as we tried no-growth in the recession of the mid-1970's; especially when we saw how little could be done about achieving more equity, at home or abroad, without an increment of economic growth to assist in its redistribution.

So a new mindset about growth is now in evidence, a step beyond indiscriminate growth on the one hand and the no-growth on the other. "An historic change of emphasis," Daniel Yankelovich calls it in a paper for the Third Woodlands Conference on Growth Policy. The evidence from current survey research is so striking that it has to be taken seriously. Every time pollsters take our national pulse, they discover a deeper alienation from the idea that more and more is better and better.

A majority of Americans, 55 percent, now say that "doing without something and living a more austere life would be a good thing."

By 79 percent to 17 percent, Americans thinks more stress should be placed on "teaching people to live with the basic essentials" than on "reaching a higher standard of living." By a similar margin, 76 percent to 17 percent, Americans would place greater stress on "learning to get our pleasure out of non-material experiences" than on "satisfying our need for more goods and services."

Now, what people say to a poll-taker is not a very accurate predicter of what they will do in real life, as we know every time we have an election. Also, people are much more willing to counsel restraint in the behaviour of others than to practice it themselves. Sluggish progress in energy conservation bears that out. (As a manager of a university system, I was always struck with the amount of litter left behind by students after a demonstration in favor of a cleaner environment.)

But the survey research findings about attitudes toward growth are so overwhelming and so consistent that Yankelovich, after reviewing all the data from Gallup, Roper, Harris, and his own firm, summed it up this way: "A new synthesis is forming, one that meshes three elements: the pursuit of economic stability, even at the cost of reduced consumption, with more modest material expectations, and with the drive to establish maximum control over one's destiny. The combination of these three elements," he says, "creates a novel American outlook." President Carter, in his energy speech in July 1979 (the one that was buried by the dramatic Cabinet changes a couple of days later), was beginning to march to the same drummer: ". . .owning things and consuming things," he said on national television, "is no substitute for meaning." Defining and teaching the new synthesis that goes beyond owning and consuming to human needs and purposes, is, naturally, a task for higher education.

Sixth, we have begun in the 1970's to realize we need a new, wider, more flexible, and more compassionate general theory of employment, interest, and money than is provided by either of the contending religions in the War of the Roses in your economics departments–Freidman's monetarism and Keynesian "fine-tuning."

"Defining and teaching the new synthesis that goes beyond owning and consuming to human needs and purposes, is, naturally, a task for higher education."

For most of the decade, inflation and recession have remained glued together at one end of the business cycle. The last time I took economics was with a young Don named Harold Wilson at Oxford University. We didn't know then (but he probably suspected) that he was going to get to be Prime Minister of Great Britain. What we learned from him back there in his drafty digs is still very clear. We learned that economic sickness is cyclical, but that one thing you could depend on was that recession is found at one end of the cycle and inflation is at the other end of the cycle. Not a terribly useful piece of information, for me or (later on) for Sir Harold either.

The oscillations of this business cycle, which may not even be cyclical, repeatedly stump the experts. Governments that reflate to create more jobs sometimes succeed in creating more inflation and unemployment too. Governments that tighten the money supply sometimes succeed in inducing recession without bringing inflation under control. Governments, like the United States, which try to yank both levers at once have to admit, as President Carter candidly did on national television not long ago, that contemporary economic theory fails to explain the way the real world works and why. In the long run, it turned out, Keynes *was* dead.

But, here's the good news: the demonstrable inadequacies of modern economic theory leave room for the development of a new economics, an economics in which fairness, poverty, human needs, and human purposes are not treated as "externalities" in a search for macroeconomic "equilibrium." The incubation for a new and wider economics that internalizes the externalities is quintessentially a task for higher education. Let's hope at least that the next Keynes is somewhere in one of your graduate schools. If he's still in kindergarten, we're in trouble.

Seventh, during the decade of the 70's, the world's "North-South" relations—that is, commerce and confrontation between the world's industrial nations and the developing nations—became the most dynamic engine in world politics. More and more, this sometimes runaway engine is driving those other relations which used to occupy center stage in the U.S. foreign policy: our Atlantic and Pacific alliances and our relations with the Soviet Union. We don't encounter the Soviets in Berlin or even in the Miditerrean any longer; we run into them in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean and Ethiopia and Angola and Afghanistan and the Caribbean.

The motivating power for this new kind of politics is rapid change in the developing South—the familiar race between population and modernization, and a newly explosive factor: the collision between modernization and traditional cultures and untraditional aspirations for economic growth with equity.

This triple collision was dramatized for us by the televised revolution in Iran. The mullahs in their long robes, spurred by a Paris-based leader communicating with them by audio cassette, teaming up with left-wing students in the streets of Tehran to set fire to tanks and automobiles, which are the hardware and also the symbols of modernization. The three forces that collided to produce the turnover in Iran—modernization vs. tradition vs. equity—are present in widely differing tactical forms in the politics of a hundred societies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The reality of Southern (in the world sense) poverty and discrimination is gradually—too gradually—

being accepted as a fact of life in U.S. politics; not just because of oil imports and food exports, but because claims for fairness and basic human needs resonate in the American political psyche.

If the U.S. turns its back on world poverty, the fact that world poverty made it to the center stage during the 1970's will make the 1980's a mighty dangerous passage for the only nation with a truly global reach. Coming to terms with the perils and potentials of the triple collision of modernization is another task for higher education that lies just ahead of us.[1]

Eighth, during the 1970's the reality of interdependence seems to have sunk in.

The idea was hard, at first, for Americans to grasp because everyone else seemed to want our aid, our technology, our weapons, our blue jeans, our hard rock, and our TV programs. (I was told not long ago by a university president in Southeast Asia that the most popular person in southeast Asia that fall was not a political leader of the area, but a television detective named "Mannix"whose reruns were playing all over the region that year.) It was not equally clear to us that we needed an influx of energy, minerals, investments, brains, and international cooperation.

Once the Arabs brought the matter to our attention with the oil embargo in 1973, we learned fast. By the decade's end, interdependence was already a cliche. A remarkable number of Americans now understand that it got cold in the Ukraine and a few months later Russian wheat purchasers had pushed up the price of a loaf of bread at the corner supermarket. Or, that the disappearance of anchovies off the West Coast of Latin America shrank the supply of protein, so soybeans became scarce. Or, that the burning of oil and coal pushes more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and risks overheating the world of our grandchildren.

Cognition of interdependence has been helped along by the cooperation that is so obviously required for international air travel and the control of international terrorism. It's reinforced by the uses of space satellites for weather observation, telecommunications, resource sensing, and military reconnaissance.

I think the greatest single instrument of education for a global perspective is the use of satellite pictures in TV weather broadcasts. If you now ask the man on the street what the weather will be, he will no longer look at the sky or lick his finger or feel his joints, he will tell you in semi-professional language about the cold front coming over Canada that will arrive in his community at a predictable time. Everyone now has the tools to visualize how the weather develops and to understand, without being formally taught, that events are interconnected, nations are interdependent, and the biosphere is more or less round.

Reinforcing that global perspective, and relating it to all the subjects in the curriculum, is an urgent task for higher education.

Ninth, the 70's have seen the dawn of planetary politics. It started with the U.N.'s Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972 and continued in Bucharest on world population, Rome on world food, Mexico City on the

[1]Harlan Cleveland, "The Triple Collision of Modernization." A lecture published by the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 1979.

". . . the demonstrable inadequacies of modern economic theory leave room for the development of a new economics, an economics in which fairness, poverty, human needs, and human purposes are not treated as 'externalities'. . ."

status of women, Buenos Aires on world water resources, Nairobi on desertification and, in 1979, a conference in Vienna on science and technology for development.

These consciousness-raising sessions are not to be judged by the pale and wordy compromises that they issue as "plans of action" just before the delegates leave for the airport. They are devices for forcing national governments to pay attention to neglected subjects. And they work. Before Stockholm, no nation had a cabinet-level ministry mandated to protect the national environment. Now, only seven years later, there are 72 such cabinet-level agencies around the world. Before Bucharest, many developing countries were denying that population was a problem, or they were claiming that the international excitement on the subject was a conspiracy to withhold help from the poor. Today, the population policy of every nation is an accepted topic of international discourse.

The recognition of global risks and the presence of global technologies creates a new kind of politics to which the adjective "inter-national", the traditional fear of losing sovereignty, and zero-sum, win-lose scenarios simply do not apply. When it comes to assessing environmental risk, controlling epidemic diseases, collecting data about the envelope of atmosphere around the globe, channelling appropriate investments from one country to another, or inventing appropriate technologies for development, the institutions are much more likely to be trans-national. Sovereignty is not "lost" but exercised by being pooled, as in the World Weather Watch; and the alternative scenarios tend to be either "win-win" or "lose-lose". The resulting politics is something new under the sun. And, in a world preoccupied with inter-national conflict, that has to be good news. It also creates another primary task for higher education.

Tenth, in the 1970's we discovered the limits to government: the incapacity to cope of what had been regarded for generations past as the most important instrument for getting things done in the public interest. In the United States, the straws in the wind are clumsy initiatives—California's Proposition 13, or the proposed Constitutional Amendment on balancing the budget. But underneath them is another one of these tidal waves of the 1970's.

In global perspective, we can see that power is leaking out of national governments in three directions at once: from the top, as sovereignty has to be pooled to secure global benefits or ward off global risks; from the sides, as transnational enterprise (profit and non-profit) performs many cross-border functions better than governments or intergovernmental organizations seem able to do; and from the bottom, as local authorities develop "growth policies" and "population policies" in an effort to assume control of their own destinies.

In the perspective of U.S. history, what we are witnessing is the end of the New Deal—the end of that era in which, if you had a major problem, the solution was to establish another government agency and throw money at the problem. I'm not knocking it. From Franklin Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson, the system worked pretty well for more than 40 years. The majority of Americans now seem to be persuaded—the polls again are overwhelmingly clear about it—that their collective purposes can be served by measures other than expanding public legislation and government spending.

People in general, perceptive as usual, have noticed that something is wrong. By overwhelming margins, current survey research records a rapid decline in the people's confidence that their government can do very much that is effective about what bugs them. In 1964, a 69 percent majority of the American public had faith in the competence of government leaders—that is, they would agree with the pollster's statement, "They know what they're doing." By 1976, the ratio of Americans holding this view had dropped to 44 percent. By 1978, it had dropped further, to 40 percent. At the end of the 50's, a 56 percent majority of the public agreed that "You can trust the government in Washington to do what is right most of the time." Two decades later, this index of public trust had been cut almost in half, to 29 percent.

You read about this all the time. But it usually is presented as tragic news in TV newscasts or newspaper editorials, and sometimes in the commentary of the survey researchers themselves. But I read these and similar polls differently. In telling it like it is, the American public is showing signs of robust mental health.

The fact is that our institutions are *not* coping. The government does *not* know what to do about the non-Keynesian fusion of inflation and recession. Many business leaders—we have to look no farther than steel or small cars or color television—*do* seem to have lost that old American spirit of free enterprise. Labor unions and other special interest groups *can not* be trusted to put the general welfare ahead of their specialized welfare. If, in these circumstances, people nevertheless were persuaded that our leaders have the situation well in hand and told the pollsters that everything was fine, wouldn't that be a symptom of mental illness? Of detachment from reality?

So, maybe, the public's perception that our institutions are not working very well is the beginning of a new wisdom. Who is more responsible for the next step, rethinking our institutions of governance, than the nation's state colleges and universities?

All these examples of alleged good news, all 10 of them, are essentially changes in *our ways of thinking* about the dangers and uncertainties that beset us. The objective "facts" of international life are no less threatening now than they were a decade ago. There are, indeed, more and bigger weapons, more morally ambiguous scientific discoveries, more political prisoners, more absolute poor, more obstacles to sound production and fair distribution, more uncertainty about energy, more baffled economists, more Third World turbulence, more unavoidable interdependence, more technologies that require human sovereignty, and more governmental incapacity in 1979 than in 1970. The difference is that we can now see how to think our way out of the mess we're in.